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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves construction of a lease and whether or 
not it grants to the Appellant, Bowen's, Inc., the right to a new 
ten-year term after the expiration of the original lease. The case 
also involves the question of whether or not Charles and Shirley 
Bowen are to be held individually liable for the obligation of 
Bowen's, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court awarded judgment in favor of the Respondents 
and against Bowen's, Inc. and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as indi-
viduals, in the amount of $35,000.00, which amount was based upon 
the rental value of the subject premises at the rate of $3,500.00 
per month, during the pendency of this action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Order awarding judgment against Charles and Shirley 
Bowen, as individuals, be reversed; and further, that the lease in 
this matter be construed as granting to Bowen's, Inc. the right to 
a new ten-year term at the expiration of that original lease. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 31, 1966, Diamonds Development, Inc. 
leased a facility comprised of a bowling alley, lounge and cafe 
known as the Kearns Bowling Lanes, and located at 3951 West 5400 
South, Kearns, Utah, to Howard C. Ne!son~n~~-· _Roy Brown. 
I 
Subsequently, Diamon~~~e-~opment~ __ Inc. sol_9~£erred\ the 
subject property to Manivest Corporation. On August 20, 1973, 
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Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown sold and transferred their intere;: 
in the bowling business to Bowen's, I_n_c. ,, Appellant herein. The 
interest of Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown in the subject lease 
was transferred to Bowen's, Inc. on August 28, 1975. (Ex. 2-P) 
Subsequently, Manivest's interest was acquired by the Respondents.' 
The following depicts the chain of the various interests 
set forth above: 
Lessor 




Howard C. Nelson and 
w. Roy Brown 
t 
Bowen's, Inc. 
The original lease agreement (Ex. 32-D) provided for a 
term of ten years with rent payable at the rate of $1,700.00 per ci 
during the heavy bowling season, from September through April; anc 
$725.00 per month during each of the other months of the year. At 
the end of the ten-year term, the lease provided an option/first 
,- -----
r~ght of refusal to the Lessee which provided for an addi~onal 
-, --~-~---~~ -~-----~ --- --~-- - - ---------- ----
ten-year term. Pursuant to the provisions of the lease, Bowen's, 
--~ ~ ---------
Inc. gave notice of their intent to renew more than ninety days 
prior to the expiration of said lease. (Ex. 3-P) 
Respondents gave notice to Appellants of the terms unde 
which the premises would be re-leased, stating that the terms wers 
non-negotiable. (Ex. 4-P) Shortly thereafter the Respondents 
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tendered an unexecuted lease to Appellants which purported to be a 
lease which was to be entered into between Respondents and a third 
party. (Ex. 7-P) The rental factor provided for in said lease was 
$780,000.00 as compared to $165,000.00 for the previous ten-year 
period. 
In response, Bowen's, Inc. sent a letter to the Respondents 
stating that the terms were unreasonable and invoked the provisions 
of the original lease relative to the appointment of appraisers for 
the purposes of determining a fair rental factor. Subsequently, 
Appellants communicated an offer to pay $2,500.00 as a monthly rental 
or in the alternative to once again invoke the terms of the original 
lease with reference to the appointment of appraisers. 
and Ex. 6-P) 
(Ex. 5-P 
On July 1, 1976, the Respondents withdrew the premises from 
consideration of a new lease (Ex. 8-P and Ex. 9-P), and upon the 
expiration of the original lease on August 31, 1976, Bowen's , Inc., 
pursuant to court order, held over and remained in possession of the 
premises during the pendency of this action. 
During the hold-over period, Bowen's, Inc. continued to 
attempt to tender to Respondents rental payments, which said payments 
were continually refused by Respondents. (Ex. 10-P and Ex. 11-P) 
The foregoing events were as a result of discussions held 
in 1975 between Appellant Bowen's, Inc. and Manivest Corporation, the 
predecessor of Respondent, relative to the re-lease or purchase of 
Manivest's interest in the subject property. Contemporaneously 
-3-
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thereto, Manivest Corporation and Bowen's, Inc. entered into an 
agreement to purchase new pin-setters, and jointly made a down 
payment to Brunswick. Subsequently, because of the ill health of 
one of the principals of Bowen's, Inc., and with the approval of 
Manivest Corporation, Bowen's, Inc. placed the bowling business, 
the cafe and lounge, for sale. Respondents Gallegos and Catten 
indicated interest in the lounge; and Respondents Symes were 
desirous of the bowling business, and pursuant to a verbal agreemen: 
with Bowen's, Inc., took over the bowling business in March, 1976, 
and stayed in possession of said premises for approximately six wed 
During this six week period, the Symes together with Mr. Gallegos~( 
Mr. Catten, purchased the building from Manivest Corporation, thus 
becoming Bowen's, Inc.'s landlord. Immediately after becoming 
Bowen's landlords, Respondents offered to purchase the businesses 
of Bowen's for $35,000.00, stating that that was all the business~ 
were worth since Bowen's had no option to release the premises and 
of course Bowen's, Inc. then gave notice of intent to release. 
Symes, Gallegos and Catten thereafter transferred their interest~' 
the subject property to Valley Lanes, a corporation formed by them, 
and which is a Respondent herein. 
The Court, after trial in this matter, found that the 
reasonable rental value of the premises for the hold-over period, ·,ij 
$3,500.00 per month, and judgment was awarded for the Respondents 
and against Bowen's, Inc. and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as indivi::I 
in the sum of $35,000.00. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AWARDING A JUDGMENT AGAINST CHARLES 
AND SHIRLEY BOWEN AS INDIVIDUALS. 
The Trial Court awarded judgment for the Respondents and 
against Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, without any grounds, 
basis, docu.~ents or evidence of any nature presented by Respondents 
that the Bowens were or should be held accountable as individuals. 
The only possible basis for which the Tria.l Court's determination 
for the individual liability of the Bowens might in any way be 
inferred is through Exhibit 1-P. Exhibit 1-P is a purchase agreement 
between Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown as sellers of the Kearns 
Bowling Lanes business and Bowen's, Inc., a Utah corporation, as the 
buyer of Kearns Bowling Lanes business. 
Paragraph 9 of Exhibit 1-P denotes that there is an existing 
lease entered into by and between Diamonds Development, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, as lessor (which lessor's interest was later transferred 
and assigned to Manivest Corporation), and Howard C. Nelson and W. 
Roy Brown, as lessees; which paragraph states: 
"Buyer agrees to faithfully perform all terms, 
covenan·cs and conditions cf tb.e said lease 
[referring to the lease entered into between 
DiarnonJ.s Development, Inc. and Howard C. Nelsen 
and w. Roy Brown] and any amendments, modifica-
·cions an.i addendw11s co said Lease .. , 
The lease that was entered into hetween Liamo11ds Development, 
Inc. an.i l:iowa:cd c. Nelso11 and W. Roy Brown was not, however, assigned 
to Bowen's, Inc. until August 28, 1375. (Ex. 2-P) 
-5-
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Thereafter, at the end of the entire purchase agreement 
between Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown as sellers of the Kearns 
Bowling Lanes business, and Bowen's, Inc., as buyer, Charles Bowen 
and Shirley Bowen guaranteed the performance of the terms and 
conditions of the purchase agreement. Charles and Shirley Bowen werl 
guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. to Howard D. Nelson 
and W. Roy Brown on a purchase agreement, but not guaranteeing the 
performance of Bowen's, Inc. to Diamonds Development, Inc. or 
Manivest Corporation or the Respondents herein on a lease which had 
not even been assigned to Bowen's, Inc. at the time that Exhibit l-l 
was entered into. 
At no time during the proceedings of the trial herein wer: 
any documents ever shown or known to be exhibited by Respondents 
that Charles and Shirley Bowen ever agreed to be held personally 
liable for the obligations of Bowens', Inc. to the lessors. The 
guarantee in the purchase agreement did not in any way run to the 
lessors or their assigns. The lessors were not a party to the 
contract between Howard c. Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's, Inc.1 
and there was no intention shown or exhibited by any of the 
provisions of Exhibit 1-P that it was the intent of the parties to 
have Charles and Shirley Bowen guarantee the performance of Bowen':, 
Inc. to the lessors. 
"Where the contract is primarily for the benefit of 
the parties thereto, the mere fact that a third 
party would be incidentally benefited does not give 
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him a right to sue for its breach. An incidental 
beneficiary has no enforceable rights or interest 
under, and hence he cannot recover on, the contract." 
17 Am Jur 2nd, §307. 
In Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 u. 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414, 
(196&) this Court defined what an incidental beneficiary is, which 
is what the Respondents are in this matter. 
The Court used an illustration from Corbin to define an 
incidental beneficiary and stated at P.2d 416: 
"Where A owes money to a creditor C, or to several 
creditors, and B promises A to supply him with money 
necessary to pay such deots, no creditor can maintain 
suit against B on this promise. . . In such cases 
the performance promised oy B does not itself discharge 
A's duty to C or in any other way affect the legal 
relations of C. It may, indeed, tend towards C's getting 
what A owes him, since it supplies A with the money or 
material that will enable A to perform, hut such a re-
sult requires the intervening voluntary action of A. 
B's performance may take place in full without C's ever 
getting any performance by A or receiving any benefit 
whatever. In such cases, therefore, C is called an 
'incidental' beneficiary and is held to have no right." 
Respondents herein are merely an incidental beneficiary to 
the contract between Nelson and Brown as sellers and Bowen's, Inc. 
as buyer of the Kearns Bowling Lanes business. Charles and Shirley 
Bowen were merely guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. in 
its agreement with Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown. They were not 
guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. with the lessors. 
To be a third-party beneficiary, as the Respondents would 
have this Court believe that it is, the obligation incurred by the 
contracting party must run for and be intended for the benefit of a 
-7-
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party who is not a party to the contract; and further, that it 
must be shown by the intent of the parties, as manifested in the 
contract itself, that it was the specific intention of the contr~~ 
ing party that the benefit is to run to a third party. 
See Chatlik v. Allstate Insurance Company, 34 Ohio App. ~ 
193, 299 N.E. 2nd 295 (1973). A third party may benefit from a 
contract even if he is not named in the contract, as long as he is 
contemplated by the parties to the contract and sufficiently 
identified thereto, but it must be shown that the contract was made 
and entered into with the intent of benefitting that third party; 
and a mere incidental or indirect benefit is not sufficient to give 
him a right of action. 
Also, Snyder v. Townhill Motors, Inc., 193 Pa. Super. 571, 
165 At. 2nd 293 (1960). A third-party beneficiary to a contract 
comes into existence when it appears in the contract itself that 
both parties to the contract intend that a third party benefit 
thereby. 
Also see Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Company, 364 Pa. 
52, 70 At. 2nd 828 (1950). To be a third-party beneficiary entitled 
to recover on a contract both parties to a contract must intend anc 
must indicate that intention in the contract; and further, that a 
primisor cannot be held liable to an alleged beneficiary of the 
contract unless the alleged beneficiary was within the promiser's 
contemplation at the time the contract was entered into and such 
liability was intentionally assumed by him in his undertaking anc 
-8-
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the obligation of the third party must be created and must affirm-
atively appear in the contract itself. 
In this particul.3.r matter, the guarantee •1:as made with the 
intent of benefitting Howard C. Nelson and w. Roy Brown in the 
event that Bowen's, Inc. ever failed in its obligations in performing 
under the purchase agreement entered into by and between Howard c. 
Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's, Inc. There was no intent shown 
in that ?Urchase agreement of any nature or any type that Charles 
and Shirley Bowen were to guarantee the performance of Bowen's, Inc. 
to the lessors of the premises, especially when the 
lease agreement was not even assigned to Bowen's, Inc. until 
August of 1975. 
Bowen's, Inc. wa.s the obligatory party and as such should be 
the only party accountable herein. Charles and Shirley Bowen have 
no duty owing to the Respondents and no duty was shown owing by them 
to the Respondents in any evidence or documents presented at trial. 
The Respondents in this matter are at best incidental beneficiaries 
to the contract between Heward C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's 
Inc., when Charles and Shirley Bowen agreed to guarantee the 
performance of Bowen's, Inc. in that purchase agreement. As such 
incidental beneficiaries, Respondents have no right of action or 
cause of action against Charles and Shirley Bowen as individuals. 
The judgment awarded to the Respondents against the Bowens as 
individuals should be reversed. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN DIAMONDS 
DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND HOWARD C. NELSON AND W. ROY BROWN SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED AS GRANTING TO THE LESSEE THE OPTION TO RENEW THE LEASE 
FOR A TEN-YEAR PERIOD. 
Paragraph 7 of the lease (Ex. 32-D) states as follows: 
"Lessors hereby give and grant to the Lessees the 
first right of refusal to renew this lease. Lessees 
shall notify the tessors in writing by registered mail 
at least ninety (90) days prior to expiration of this 
lease of lessees intention to release said premises 
herein contained, otherwise Lessors shall assume that 
the Lessees does not desire to release and this lease 
shall terminate on August 31, 1976. Should Lessees 
desire to release, Lessors shall submit to Lessees a 
proposed new lease for a ten (10) year term or a boni-
fied offer to lease by a third party within thirty (30) 
days of date that request for release has been received 
by Lessor. Should the Lessee feel the lease terms 
unreasonable then Lessee will hire a competent appraiser 
to place a fair market lease value on said property. 
Should Lessor then feel this market value not reasonable, 
they will obtain a competent appraiser to place a fair 
market value on said property and equipment. Should the 
two appraisers and Lessee and Lessor fail to arrive at 
a meeting of the minds, then the two appraisers will 
appoint a third appraiser by mutual agreement, to act as 
a referee and all parties concerned will be bound by the 
finding of appraisers as to fair market value." 
This lease, which was assigned to Bowen's, Inc. on August 
28, 1975, (Ex. 2-P) is unclear as to whether or not an option or 
first right of refusal is granted to the lessee. However, there 
can be no question that the langauge in that provision grants to 
the lessee a right to renew, and as such should be construed in 
favor of the lessee. 
"As a general rule, when construing provisions 
of a lease relative to renewal, the tenant is 
favored". 
32 Am Jur 809, and 
Russell V. Valentine, 14 U. 2d : 
376 P.2d 548 (1960) 
-10-
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There is uncertainty in the lease agreement, but that 
uncertainty should be construed in favor of the tenant. such a 
holding was dictated in Continental Bank & Trust v. Stewart, 4 u.2d 
228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955), when this Court stated that interpretation 
of the contract where ambiguity exists: 
"The Court will endeavor to give the contract a rational 
and just construction. This rule is echoed in apt 
langauge by Mr. Page in his treatise on contracts: 
as between two constructions, each probable, one of 
which makes the contract fair and reasonable and the 
other of which makes it unfair and unreasonable, the 
former should always be preferred". (P.2d 893) 
From the langauge of the lease agreement itself and from 
the intent and actions of the parties, Manivest Corporation, there 
is no doubt that a renewal of the lease agreement after the expira-
tion of the primary term was intended by all parties. Manivest 
Corporation showed its intent on renewal of the lease when it 
entered into an agreement with Bowen's, Inc. in 1975, for a down 
payment on pin-setters for the bowling alley. The down payment 
which was made on the pin-setters amounted to a very substantial 
investment on equipment which could not have been installed until 
the Summer of 1976, which is within a few months of the termination 
of the primary term of the lease. It was the intention of Manivest 
Corporation that it would renew the lease at the expiration of the 
primary ten-year term. 
This intent was also noted by Mr. Symes during the trial 
when he noted that Manivest was going to give an option on the 
property to whoever the lessee was at the time of the expiration of 
-11-
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the primary term of the lease. (TR-179) It wasn't until Valley 
Lanes, Respondents herein, became lessors of the property that it 
was apparent that the lease would not be renewed under any 
circumstances. Valley Lanes and its immediate predecessors, who 
were the other Respondents herein, sent notice to Bowen's, Inc. that 
they would not re-3..ease the premises under any conditions. (TR-154 
and Ex. 8-P) 
All of the Respondents herein knew that the intent of 
Manivest Corporation was to renew and/or negotiate a new ten year 
lease on the subject property. (TR-179, 182, 217 and 218) 
It became apparent to the Respondents that they might have 
a chance to eliminate any interest that Bowen's, Inc. might have had 
in the property by purchasing Mani vest Corporation's interest in tte 
property and then not renewing the lease. By not renewing the lease, 
the Symes could obtain the bowling business which they had wanted, 
and Canton and Gallegos could obtain the lounge and caf e business 
that they wanted, without either party paying for any of the good-
will, customers, fixtures and improvements that Bowen's, Inc. had 
placed into the businesses over the past few years. The Responden'.5 
were not acting in good faith in their meager attempt to renew the 
lease after they had obtained the property from Manivest Corporati:1• 
The Respondents demanded $6, 500. 00 monthly rental from Bowen's, In:. 
which is 3.8 times the monthly rent of $1,700.00 under the old lea:e. 
(Ex. 4-P). 
The Trial Court found a monthly rent of the property to 
-12-
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$3,500.00, and the appraiser for Bowen's, Inc. determined the amount 
to be even less than the amount determined by the Trial Court. (TR-297 
The Respondents had no real intention of renewing the lease with 
Bowen's, Inc. 
The proposed lease as set out in Exhibit 4-P stated that: 
"There will be no negotiations from the specific 
terms amended and added into the proposed lease," 
which terms as set forth by the Respondents were totally unconscion-
able and unreasonable. 
Bowen's, Inc. invoked the provision relating to the appoint-
ment of appraisers (Ex. 32-D, Par. 7) for determining a reasonable 
rental value on the premises. (Ex 5-P) However, Bowen's, Inc. was 
forced off the property before it could obtain an appraiser. (TR-123 
thru 125) 
Even if Bowen's, Inc. had obtained an appraiser for the 
property, such an appraisal would have been meaningless because there 
was never any real intent on the part of the Respondents to re-lease 
the premises for any amount less than a monthly rental of $6,500.00. 
Sixty days prior to the expiration of the primary term of 
the lease, the Respondents gave notice that there would be no 
re-leasing of the subject property. (Ex. 9-P) The Respondents had 
obtained what they had desired, namely the bowling, cafe, and lounge 
businesses, and had effectively paid nothing for these businesses. 
Such an inequity should not be allowed, especially under the 
circumstances presented herein. Bowen's, Inc. should be granted the 
right to re-lease the subject property at a reasonable rental value 
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and not lose that right because of the unconscionable rent demandec 
by the Respondents, which rent could not have been met from the 
operations of the bowling business. 
POINT III 
THE APPOINTMENT OF APPRAISERS AS PROVIDED BY PARAGRAPH VJ! 
OF THE LEASE MERELY CONSTITUTES A METHOD OF ARRIVING AT A REASONABU 
RENTAL VALUE. 
The provision in paragraph VII of Exhibit 3 2-D which relates 
to the appointment of appraisers to determine fair rental value is 
merely a method to determine a fair rental value and not arbitratio" 
of dispute. 
In Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Company, 16 U.2d 
223, 398 P.2d 873, the Supreme Court struck down private arbitratio;, 
as a method of settling future disputes as being against public 
policy since in the court's opinion, basic liberties are impaired 
and further stated that such arbitration may prevent access to the 
courts, which is counter to the purpose as set forth in Const. Art. 
l §10 and §11; Art. 8 and 9; UCA (1953), 78-21-1. In Barnhart an 
uninsured motorist clause in an insurance policy called for arbitra· 
tion of any controversies or future disputes. The case at hand is 
clearly distinguishable for the reason that notice of Appellant's 
intent to re-lease was given, and Respondents responded. Thus, if 
the court finds that the provisions call for arbitration, a positiC 
in which we do not agree, the agreement to arbitrate, occurred by 
virtue of the notice of intent to re-lease, and Respondent's 
response thereto. Additionally, if in fact a dispute arose, it di 
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not arise until after the aforesaid agreement came into existence and 
thus the agreement, if there be one to arbitrate was to arbitrate the 
dispute or grievance presently in existence, which is not outlawed 
by Barnhart. 
Barnhart can further be distinguished based on the court's 
ruling in the 1968 case of Young v. Bridwell, 20 U.2d 686, wherein 
the court held that where a lease contains a clause granting an option 
subject to arbitration so far as rent is concerned, the lessee has 
given notice of its intent to exercise the right, that this is binding 
on the lessor insofar as term of lease is concerned. The Supreme 
Court itself, seems to distinguish Barnhart wherein arbitration is 
used as a method to determine fair rental value. This merely 
recognizes the practical necessity of providing a method of determin-
ing rental value since if the method is not stated in the lease, the 
provision may fail for lack of certainty. Courts in other 
jurisdictions also recognize arbitration as a method to determine 
fair rental value. Beel et al v. Dill, 173 Kan 897, 252 P.2d 931 
(1953), and Chaney et al, v. Schneider, 206 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1949). 
Here defendants proposed amendments to the old lease which related 
only to rent and a bond. There was no dispute as to the other 
provisions of the lease, and the method outlined to determine fair 
rental value would thus be the logical next step. 
The appraisal method of determining fair rental value is 
also accepted as a method to determine fair rental value and it is 
Appellant's position that such is the method provided in the lease 
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in question. The Court need not even concern itself with problems 
of arbitration. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF 
THE MONTHLY RENTAL IN THIS MATTER. 
The Trial Court awarded the Respondents $3, 500. 00 monthly 
rental for each month that Bowen's, Inc. held the property during 
the pendency of this action. However, neither appraiser from either 
of the parties ever testified that $3,500.00 was a reasonable monthl1 
rental for the premises herein. The appraiser for the Respondents 
determined the value of the monthly rental to be $3,800.00 per mont\ 
if the property was in its present condition, and $5, 700. 00 per mont. 
when the property was improved with new pin-setters and other impro'1e 
ments. (TR-272) These figures were based on what other businesses 
in the bowling business were doing, and had nothing to do with the 
business of Bowen's, Inc. The appraiser for the Respondents had 
guessed at the amount of business and revenue that Bowen's, Inc. was 
making to arrive at its figure. (TR-274) 
Since the appraiser for the Respondents had no basis for 
his determination as to the monthly rental, his testimony was of 
little to no value in helping to determine a fair monthly rental for 
the premises herein. 
The appraiser for Bowen's, Inc. used a cost approach to 
determine a fair monthly rental of the property. (TR-298 thru 30i 
Using a cost approach method, the appraiser for Bowen's, Inc. 
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determined the value of t'.1e property to be $21,500.00 per year in its 
present condition (which is approximately $1,800.00 per month) and 
$41,800.00 per year if new pin-setters were installed (or 
approximately $3,500.00 per month). (TR-297) 
The $3,500.00 per month figure arrived at by the Court is 
approximately the same amount as determined by Bowen's, Inc.'s 
appraisers' valuations of the premises for when it had the pin-
setters installed. The Trial Court had thus misapplied the figures 
in this amount as to the reasoanble rental value of the property, and 
the property should therefore be decreased to $1,800.00 per month in 
relation to the figures as determined by the appraisers for Bowen's,In 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's finding that Charles and Shirley Bowen 
were individually liable along with Bowen's, Inc. to the Respondents 
is incorrect and without any basis of support. The judgment obtained 
against Charles and Shirley Bowen should be reversed and they should 
be dismissed from this action. 
Bowen's, Inc. should be given the right to renew the lease 
in this matter. The Respondents acted in bad faith throughout their 
course of dealings with Bowen's, Inc. Equity would demand that 
Bowen's, Inc. be given the right to obtain some sort of remuneration 
for the businesses which it had developed which the Respondents 
obtained when they refused to renew the lease with Bowen's, Inc. 
The Trial Court had misapplied the figures as to the 
monthly rental value of the property. The judgment awarded to the 
Respondents should be decreased to the appropriate figure of 
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$1,800.00 per month for the monthly rental of the property during 
the period of time that the property was held by Bowen's, Inc. 
during the pendency of this action, or in the alternative that this 
matter be remanded to determine the appropriate monthly rental of 
the premises. 
Served two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellants 
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